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I observe that, as the physics side of the OPERA-anomaly story is apparently unfolding, there can still be motivation for philosophy
of science to analyze the six months of madness physicists spent chasing the dream of a new fundamental-physics revolution. I here
mainly report data on studies of the OPERA anomaly that could be relevant for analyses from the perspective of phenomenology of
philosophy of science. Most of what I report is an insider’s perspective on the debate that evolved from the original announcement
by the OPERA collaboration of evidence of superluminal neutrinos. I also sketch out, from a broader perspective, some of the
objectives I view as achievable for the phenomenology of philosophy of science.
Part of the work I do for my day job, as a theoretical physi-
cist, is aimed at establishing a ”quantum-gravity phenomenol-
ogy” [1]. Until not long ago the expression ”quantum-gravity
phenomenology” was thought to be an oxymoron (see, e.g.,
Ref. [2]). But it is now a real scientific programme, or at least
so it is thought to be by a still small but fast-growing number of
physicists (examples of quantum-gravity-phenomenology stud-
ies, strongly biased toward my own works, are in Refs. [3-12]).
I do realize that what I am here proposing may appear (and
perhaps is) even more nonsensical: I will argue that at least
a certain part of philosophy of science (the one that revolves
around the notion of “theory of knowledge”) constitutes a sci-
ence in itself. And of course by this I mean that those aspects of
philosophy of science are not well served confining their analy-
sis to the realm of endless debates. Instead they can and should
be subjected to an appropriate form of experimental scrutiny.
From my limited perspective as amateur philosopher it ap-
pears that this is already done to some extent. Certain ”data” are
used when philosophy contemplates questions such as ”what is
knowledge?” (or [13] “where is knowledge?”), ”what is the sci-
entific method?”, ”does knowledge grow continuously or only
through periods of scientific revolution?”. The data which are
used are data of the same nature I am here reporting, but they
are typically taken from the history of science (often from the
history of fundamental physics, which is also the context I am
here focusing on). So at least naively one can view philosophy
of science as a science based on postdictions. Perhaps this is
why most scientists remain unimpressed by the philosophy-of-
science debate: it comes with the trade that we pay no attention
to postdictions.
Lacking the needed training in philosophy for articulating
my case logically, I am here going to use1 as illustration of the
perspective I advocate the context of the recent debate on the
superluminal-neutrino anomaly reported by the OPERA collab-
oration [14, 15].
For six months it felt, at least to a theoretical physicist such
as myself, as if everyone was intrigued by the OPERA anomaly:
even physicists working outside fundamental physics, even other
scientists, even the media, even those working at the small gro-
cery store on the ground floor of my building.
1An earlier version of these notes was proposed to Nature last February.
A one-page extract (essentially focusing on the possible implications for the
“blind-analysis standards”, which is one of the issues I shall consider here)
was then published as Nature 483 (2012) 125.
But I could see no trace of philosophers of science. I must have
missed some interest which surely developed in the right exclu-
sive small circles of philosophers. But what I imagined would
happen from the philosophy side had to be of such a magnitude
I could not possibly miss it.
Where were all those theorists of scientific revolutions? How
hard were they trying to guess whether this was the dawn of a
new scientific revolution? Or was this ”normal science”?
Which of the tens of models proposed for the OPERA anomaly
went into a degenerative phase more quickly? which ones ex-
perienced at least a 48-hour window of progressiveness? If the
OPERA anomaly survived a bit longer which of those tens of
research programmes should have been more generously funded?
And, if OPERA had not found a systematic error, would special
relativity be falsified?
I imagined the philosophy echo would be a bang I could not
miss. It must have been a blip which I did miss.
1. OPERA’s philosophy-of-science data
1.1. Preliminaries: asking “what did we learn?”
Before actually going to the philosophy-of-science data re-
porting, I want to comment on the many paths that can take the-
oretical physics to new “knowledge”. I will do this borrowing
from my own familiarity, as an interested onlooker [16], with
the interest generated by the so-called ”centauro events” [17]:
some cosmic-ray events were being reported with highly asym-
metric structure (like a centauro) and producing nearly exclu-
sively charged pions, whereas our current particle-physics the-
ories suggest that in such cases typically one third of the pions
should be neutral. Motivated in part by the desire of explaining
the centauro events the community figured out that something
roughly (but, and I stress this, not exactly) similar to a centauro
event is actually predicted by our theories in certain peculiar
circumstances. ”Inspired” by the centauro events these previ-
ously unnoticed and potentially important aspects of particle
physics (particle-physics theory) were understood. And yet it is
now rather well established [17] that the centauro events were
an artifact of the limitations of the relevant experiments.
So my readers should keep in mind that I am adopting a
rather broad perspective on what could constitute knowledge.
And I tend to assume that a variety of paths can lead to such
knowledge. But I do not think we can proceed as it appears
to be suggested by some philosophers, who choose to confine
their analysis of the connection between “method” and ”knowl-
edge” to the appreciation of the fact that the ideal path to dis-
coveries/knowledge would be one of unlimited resources for
all methodologies. Even within my amatorial philosophy one
can easily appreciate the fact that ideally this would maximize
our knowledge. But the way science actually works is strongly
affected by the fact that our resources are far from unlimited.
The limited resources available impose difficult choices for as-
signing different priority among different methodologies and
even among different research programmes adopting essentially
the same methodology. Part of my motivation for proposing a
phenomenology of philosophy of science comes from the con-
viction that philosophy of science cannot shy away from these
challenges involved in assigning priority and funding. The sci-
ence of philosophy of science should, in my view, play a crucial
role in such decisions. Daring to assign more priority to one
proposal over another, while making sure that the overall distri-
bution of resources keeps some balance, especially by not pe-
nalizing too severely proposals on new methodologies. Those
new methodologies would appear less promising than method-
ologies with an already established knowledge/discovery track
record, and should therefore be assigned lower priority. But
some new methodologies should receive at least modest en-
couragement, since we cannot exclude the possibility of new
methodologies eventually proving to be better (or better suited
to new times) than previously successful ones. This fits per-
fectly with the view of phenomenology of science as a science:
rather than ”statically best” theories of knowledge we should
conceptualize, in the sense of Lakatos, ”research programmes”
in phenomenology of science, and expect that those research
programmes will experience stages of superiority over compet-
ing programmes followed by degenerative stages.
1.2. 21st-century scientific method
A first few observations are warranted by the OPERA-related
philosophy-of-science data contributing to the impression that
something is changing in the way science is made. At least in
fundamental physics some macroscopic changes are in progress,
probably rendering obsolete (or perhaps urgently modern?) all
previous discussions on the scientific method. This is tangible
to anyone whose work in fundamental physics, as in my case,
spans at least over the last 20 years. Fundamental physics is
different now (or at least works differently now) with respect to
the situation 20 years ago.
Part of this is visible in the time sequence of events related
to the OPERA anomaly. On September 22nd (2011) we had
the first release [14] of OPERA data on neutrino speeds, but
insiders were reached by rumors about it as early as a few weeks
before, and it was on every blog on the internet planet by a
week before the announcement. Then on November 17th (again
insiders and blogs had known it for a few days) there was a
second announcement of OPERA data on neutrino speeds [15].
The relation between the first and second announcement is of
interest for this manuscript in several ways. But let me first note
down that the two announcements were consistent with each
other and would imply speeds v such that (v− c)/c ' 2 · 10−5
(denoting as usual with c the speed-of-light scale) for muon
neutrinos of a few tens of GeVs produced at Geneva’s CERN
laboratory and detected at Gran Sasso’s LNGS laboratory (after
a journey of about 730 Km through the Earth’s crust). A result
of superluminal speed (v > c) with a nominal confidence of
about six standard deviations [14, 15].
Within some 48 hours of the first announcement, last septem-
ber, of the OPERA findings [15] there were already a few analy-
ses (see, e.g., Refs. [18-20]) pointing out that such superluminal
speeds for ∼ 20GeV neutrinos were not only at odds with the
principles of Einstein’s relativity, but actually appeared to make
little sense also when compared with other determinations of
neutrino speeds. It was noticed [18-20] that using neutrinos of
energies about 3 orders of magnitude smaller observed from su-
pernova SN1987a one can establish a very conservative limit on
anomalous neutrino speeds at the level of 1 part in 109. And for
neutrinos with energies of about an order of magnitude higher
than OPERA’s we could rely [18] on the laboratory results re-
ported in Ref. [21], excluding peculiarities of neutrino speeds
with accuracy better than 1 part in 104. This led to the conclu-
sion summarized in Fig.1: trusting OPERA required not only
giving up on Einstein relativity but also to do so by introducing










Figure 1: A “cartoonist impression” of how the energy dependence of neutrino
speeds should have looked, if we trusted the OPERA findings. The prediction
of Einstein relativity over all this range of energies is v − c ' 0, since al-
ready at 10−3 GeV neutrinos are effectively massless. The OPERA result at
∼ 20GeV should have been matched to the previous upper bounds established
around ∼ 10−2GeV , based on neutrino observations from SN1987a, and the
upper bound obtained with the travel-time studies for neutrinos of ∼ 100GeV
reported in Ref. [21].
These considerations amplified the skepticism toward the
OPERA result. All the main aspects of the OPERA setup came
under scrutiny in an unprecedented example of what 21st cen-
tury scientific method might look like, especially exploiting the
empowerment of internet communication. Several concerns
were raised [22] with respect to some of the GPS aspects of
OPERA’s analysis and possible subtle roles played by ordi-
nary relativistic effects, but these concerns were very quickly
addressed [23, 24], finding that they could not explain what
OPERA had reported.
The objections which appeared to pose the most severe chal-
lenge concerned (see, e.g., Ref. [25]) the statistical methods
used in deriving the travel time estimated by OPERA. That first
version of the OPERA analysis [14] used data obtained with
a setup such that the neutrino pulses produced at CERN lasted
about 104 nanoseconds, and sophisticated inferences where needed
to derive the travel-time anomaly reported by OPERA, which is
actually worth only ∼ 60 nanoseconds. The statistical analysis
also had to take into account that each neutrino in the pulses
only has a tiny chance of interacting with the OPERA detector,
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since neutrinos interact only through the “weak interactions”.
There was a (relatively) easy way to address such concerns:
redo the experiment with neutrino pulses of shorter duration.
I am sure I am not the only theorist to be impressed about how
experimentalists at CERN and LNGS managed to arrange ex-
actly this new experiment in just a few weeks. For the second
run of the OPERA travel-time experiment, which is the main
upgrade between OPERA’s first announcement [14] and its sec-
ond announcement [15], the neutrino pulses produced at CERN
lasted ∼ 3 nanoseconds. And the results of this second run
are perfectly consistent with the previously announced results
of the first run of the OPERA travel-time experiment. So we
learned (we acquired knowledge about the fact) that the statis-
tical analysis developed by OPERA in order to handle the time
broadness of the original (first-run) neutrino pulses is a reliable
way to perform such studies, which may prove valuable for fu-
ture experiments. And a new, internet-based, way for scruti-
nizing puzzling experimental results was tried for the first time,
proving to be of amazing effectiveness. The learning curve of
anyone involved in studies of the OPERA anomaly was impres-
sive, thanks to the fact that a world-wide network of scientists
was kept well connected by the internet, and also exploiting the
new rapid-publication methods afforded by internet, such as the
Arxiv.
Overall there were more than 200 OPERA-inspired studies
which appeared on arXiv over the six months of debate. This
should be compared with the typical evolution of the literature
in most areas of fundamental physics: for example in quantum-
gravity research, a pretty active area, one would say that a result
has taken by storm the community if it inspired 200 studies over
a time of 4 or 5 years. And it is important to notice that the six
months it took for this 200 OPERA-inspired studies are compa-
rable to the standards for the time needed by the refereeing pro-
cess for a single paper to complete; indeed, this was all based on
the arXiv preprint by the OPERA collaboration. In this respect
I should incidentally observe that, at least within fundamen-
tal physics, the peer-review system had being showing signs of
obsoleteness increasingly over the last few years, and these as-
pects of the OPERA story may suggest we should declare it
officially dead. The progress of the next fundamental-physics
revolution will not be recorded in conventional journals.
1.3. Indirect bounds: OPERA had to be wrong?
On the basis of some preliminary reports [26, 27] which
started to circulate some six months after the original OPERA
announcement (when the relevant manuscript by the OPERA
collaboration was still going through the refereeing process) it
seems we must assume an unnoticed systematic error was re-
sponsible for the OPERA results. Interestingly it was not one of
the systematic errors the community had been suspicious about:
in the long chain of contributions to the travel-time determina-
tion that needed to be kept under control with 10-nanosecond
accuracy it simply happened that a couple of steps (perhaps
most notably [26] a connection by fiber-optic cable) were not
performing as they should have.
This ending2 to the OPERA story came as no surprise to
anyone. One should not imagine that the 200 papers on OPERA
2Just as I was getting ready to publicize these notes, new results were re-
ported [35] by OPERA and other neutrino experiments which fully settle the
issue: we can now confidently assess the present situation as one with no ev-
idence of superluminal neutrinos. Of course, it is still possible that when we
will manage to reach even better sensitivities, with future upgrades of these ex-
periments, a true anomaly be found. Neutrinos may well be superluminal, but
not at ∼ 20GeV , at least not within a sensitivity of a few parts in 105.
imply physicists were expecting it to hold up. To give you a
sense of the atmosphere I could say that we were estimating the
odds against OPERA were ten thousand to one. But for many
physicists one in ten thousand of contributing to a major discov-
ery is far better than our usual 100% chance of doing something
technically sound and elegant, but of marginal significance.
It must be of interest to philosophy of science to appreciate
why we were estimating the odds against OPERA would be,
say, ten thousand to one. Part of this is easy: it just reflects
the fact that it happens frequently in science that a particularly
striking experimental result is suddenly reported, and then it
is established that an unknown bias or source of uncertainty
affects those data. We learn on the field, by experience, that
out of, say, a thousand instances of truly shocking experimen-
tal results only one ends up holding up after further scrutiny.
So this brings us, say, to one thousand to one, a huge amount
of confidence against OPERA. But my rough estimate is ten
thousand to one, so this huge amount of experience-based con-
fidence against OPERA was actually only a tangible but small
contribution to our overall confidence against OPERA.
Where did the rest come from?
What was so suspicious about the OPERA result?
Since it seems the result was after all wrong, have we learned
that our suspicions against the OPERA result were correct?
Should we then have even more confidence in our suspicions in
future similar situations?
Evidently these questions concern a form of knowledge that
plays a crucial role in how fundamental physics works. And yet
it is not contained in any single experimental or mathematical
result. One of the main reasons for our skepticism specifically
toward the OPERA result, was the perceived strength of indirect
bounds on superluminality of OPERA neutrinos. Indeed, the
significance (or lack thereof) of indirect bounds in fundamental
physics is one of the main issues I want to contemplate in these
notes.
As background to this issue of indirect bounds on superlu-
minality of OPERA-type neutrinos one should take notice of the
fact that, perhaps surprisingly for researchers working outside
of fundamental physics, there had been already a significant
amount of theory work on possible superluminal speeds well
in advance (some as early as a couple of decades ago) of the
OPERA findings. This had been mainly motivated by research
on the quantum-gravity problem, particularly originating from:
(i) quantum-gravity-motivated scenarios with additional (but tiny,
and nearly invisible) spatial dimensions, and
(ii) quantum-gravity-motivated scenarios hosting a new princi-
ple such that the Planck length, the tiny length scale (∼ 10−35m)
which we expect to characterize the quantum-gravity realm [28,
29], sets the minimum allowed value of wavelength of a parti-
cle.
Since Einstein’s relativity strictly predicts that there cannot be
a minimum allowed value of wavelength, some studies had led
to speculations about departures from Einstein relativity at the
Planck-length. And with extra spatial dimensions it had been
noticed that particles having access to the extra dimensions (not
all types of particles would have access to the extra dimensions)
could be perceived as traveling superluminally from the per-
spective of observers confined to our good old 3 spatial dimen-
sions.
So we had pre-existing models for superluminal particles,
and actually it was through known results about these mod-
els that the superluminality of neutrinos tentatively reported by
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OPERA appeared to be particularly hard to believe. This origi-
nates mainly from the fact that the standard way to describe su-
perluminal particles in the relevant literature relies on a formula
giving the dependence on momentum of the physical velocity




+ ∆(p) , (1)
where the first term is the standard special-relativistic formula
and ∆(p) is the desired new-physics correction term. If for p ∼
20GeV one imposes ∆(p) ∼ 2 · 10−5 c then the OPERA claim
is easily reproduced. As shown in my Fig. 1 an awkwardly
fine-tuned momentum-dependent correction ∆(p) would then
be needed for compliance with bounds obtained at other ranges
of momenta, and a serious challenge is present even confin-
ing the analysis at the same range of energies of the OPERA
neutrinos. This is due to the fact that a ∆(p) in the veloc-
ity formula must also be taken into account in the analysis of
measurements that are not velocity measurements, since it plays
an indirect role in the way we compute in particular the cross
section for particle-physics processes. And when this is done
one finds [30, 31, 32] large anomalies for particle-physics pro-
cesses, large enough to contradict known experimental facts:
if the new effects are strong enough (if ∆(p) is large enough
at OPERA energies) to produce the speed anomalies of a few
parts in 105 tentatively reported by OPERA, then the same vio-
lations also affect some well-studied particle-physics processes
at a level that contradicts our established experimental results
for those processes [30, 31, 32].
When this line of reasoning was brought to full fruition (and
we were only less that a month into the OPERA-anomaly sea-
son [30, 31, 32]) it had a strong effect on the attitude toward
OPERA of most theorists. It reached the point that some physi-
cists felt3 that the OPERA result could be “refuted” [33, 34] on
the basis of such arguments focusing on indirect implications.
1.4. Trying nonetheless with superluminal neutrinos
As I shall stress more forcefully later in this manuscript, in-
direct bounds have some limitations. The case against OPERA
built in Refs. [30, 31, 32] was “convincing enough” accord-
ing to some physicists, but was not conclusive. And this be-
came of interest to some of the physicists contemplating the
OPERA anomaly. After all we had known from the very begin-
ning (at least “thousand to one”) that the most likely hypothesis
would be that the OPERA anomaly was an experimental arti-
fact. So from the very beginning we were just looking for a
second most-likely hypothesis. Such a second-most-likely hy-
pothesis would have been a tool for investigating the OPERA
anomaly, if it happened to stand up long enough. For example it
could have guided our searches of some (possibly indirect) con-
firmation of the OPERA anomaly. Such searches could have
progressed alongside the main effort scrutinizing the result by
repeating the same measurement. From this perspective results
such as those in Refs. [30, 31, 32] did not change the situation
very much: they simply gave us additional reasons to think that
the OPERA result could only be correct if a particularly subtle
new class of processes was being discovered (conclusion of the
3It may be of some anecdotal interest that the authors of these papers “re-
futing OPERA”, in Refs. [33, 34], include two Nobel laureates.
same type as the one I here summarized in Fig. 1). And our ex-
perience tells us that this does not happen often, but of course it
can (and occasionally does) happen.
The most visible limitations of the case against OPERA
built in Refs. [30, 31, 32] originate from the fact that the model
used for deriving the argument requires departures from spe-
cial relativity involving a preferred frame. Those models stand
to special relativity just like the models of Lorentz and others
stood to Galilean relativity: they required a preferred “ether
frame”. One way in which this could be exploited for going
around the point made by Refs. [30, 31, 32] was used for exam-
ple in studies such as the ones in Refs. [36, 37, 38]: once we al-
low for a preferred frame to arise than we have room within the
theory for allowing, together with the speed law (1), also other
anomalous features. Combining (1) with other features allowed
by a preferred frame setup one could have [36, 37, 38] super-
luminal particles with bearable consequences for well-studied
cross sections.
And one could also try something more ambitious: from
a relativistic perspective it is of particular interest to contem-
plate the possibility that the speed-of-light limit so far con-
firmed experimentally might be violated in some appropriate
regimes and yet the theory be still fully relativistic, without
a preferred “ether” frame. For this too there were scenarios
studied in the literature well before the OPERA anomaly (see,
e.g., Refs. [39, 40, 41, 42]), and motivated by aspects of the
quantum-gravity problem. What is here relevant is that it had
been shown [39] that superluminal speeds are possible preserv-
ing the relativity of inertial frames but they should necessarily
be accompanied by a modification of the law of conservation of
momentum4.
So for example in computations of lifetimes the evaluation
of the contribution from a given two-body particle decay, when
including the effects of the presence of a term ∆(p) in Eq. (1),
must necessarily also include a deformation of the momentum-



















imposed [39] by the requirement of absence of a preferred frame
ensures automatically that the prediction for the lifetime is af-
fected only in minute way by the deformation. This was re-
analyzed from the OPERA-neutrino perspective in Refs. [43,
44, 45, 46], showing that the argument for “refuting OPERA”
discussed in Refs. [30, 31, 32] only applies to theories with a
preferred frame. So within departures from special relativity
preserving the equivalence of inertial frames one could at least
try to accommodate the OPERA anomaly. And yet also this sce-
nario encountered huge difficulties for producing effects such as
the ones needed for the OPERA anomaly. In particular, for this
no-preferred-frame option the requirement of matching other
4More precisely the law of composition of momenta must be deformed
in momentum-dependent fashion if the speed law is deformed in momentum-
dependent fashion. This is a standard situation for relativistic theories, where
the overall structure must be balanced to avoid the presence of a preferred class
of inertial observers. In particular, we are all familiar with the fact that a speed-
dependent deformation of the Galilean velocity law can be implemented in con-
sistently relativistic fashion (then replacing Galilean relativity with special rel-
ativity) only at the cost of also having a velocity-dependent deformation of the
law of composition of velocities.
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data on neutrino speeds is rather severe. The delicate balance
between modification of the speed law and modification of the
law of conservation of momentum is hard to achieve, and the
few cases that are known to be suitable do not accommodate
complex (“ad-hoc”) forms of dependence of speed on energy-
momentum of the type shown in my Fig.1.
As mentioned above superluminal particles could also be
accommodated in the recently fashionable scenarios (much work
on this for the last decade or so) with “large” extra spatial di-
mensions (as “large” as 10−20m), but that too was ultimately
found to be not so well suited for accommodating the OPERA
anomaly. At first the most promising option of this sort ap-
peared [47, 48, 49] to be one where only “sterile neutrinos”5
could have access to the extra dimensions. The muon neutrinos
produced and detected at OPERA are evidently standard “active
neutrinos” which, in addition to gravitational interactions, also
experience the weak force, and it is through weak-force interac-
tions that they are produced and detected. These known parti-
cles are weakly interacting at low energies because they do not
carry electromagnetic or strong-interaction charges, and at low
energies both gravity and the weak force are very weak. There
is no robust evidence of the existence of sterile neutrinos, but
it is a conceivable and much-studied (even pre-OPERA) variant
of neutrinos, which only interacts gravitationally. For them also
the weak interactions would be mute.
For sterile neutrinos there were theoretical results, well in
advance of the OPERA announcement, on mechanisms that
could endow them with effectively superluminal properties, es-
sentially by using the geometry of the extra dimensions as an
opportunity for shortcuts, available only to sterile neutrinos.
It was immediately clear that for this scenario the main chal-
lenge would reside in the fact that what OPERA studies are
active neutrinos. The only opportunity for involving a superlu-
minal sterile neutrino in the OPERA story comes from a second
layer of speculation: quantum mechanics allows certain types
of particles to “oscillate” into one another, so that one might
envisage an active neutrino produced at CERN and being de-
tected as an active neutrino at LNGS but traveling from CERN
to LNGS with properties that in part reflect those of a sterile
neutrino, including the conjectured superluminality. But this
is easier said than done: working out the mathematics it was
found that this scenario could produce an effect comparable
to the one reported by OPERA only at the cost of introducing
rather intense active/sterile neutrino “oscillations”, too intense
for complying with the constraints on such oscillations from
other experiments [48].
In summary also the attempts of accommodating superlu-
minal OPERA neutrinos in frameworks not subject to the con-
cerns reported in Ref. [30, 31, 32] encountered very severe dif-
ficulties. And this brings me back to the issue of whether and
5Let me briefly summarize, for the benefit of those readers who are unfamil-
iar with those notions, the most significant properties of “active neutrinos” and
of “sterile neutrinos”. The only neutrinos we have solid experimental evidence
for are active neutrinos. Active neutrinos are indeed part of the presently reign-
ing Standard Model of particle physics. These neutrinos are “active” because,
in addition to the tenuous gravitational interactions, they take part in the weak
interactions. They are not as “active” as electrons, which in addition take part
in electromagnetic interactions, and they are much less “active” than quarks,
which take part in all interactions including the strong interactions, but as far as
it goes for neutrinos they are at least active in the weak-interaction sense. The
other possibility for neutrinos are “sterile neutrinos” for which we only have
at present indirect and inconclusive evidence. A sterile neutrino does not even
take part in the weak interactions (so it is only subjected to the gravitational
interactions, which are by far the weakest of all interactions).
how theoretical work is relevant in assessing an experimental
result. It is striking that on the basis of the evidence I here sum-
marized theorists were concluding (even before any clear in-
dication of an overlooked systematic error) that describing the
OPERA claim might be hopeless. Especially since some siz-
able overlooked systematic errors were indeed eventually found [26,
27], this OPERA story leaves us with the challenging question
of whether such a supremacy of theory over experiment might
be possible: can an experimental result of a type not attempted
previously (not exactly the same measurement) be refuted by
theorists on the basis of the fact that they cannot find a theory
that matches the relevant experimental result with other known
experimental facts?
1.5. Still a third road: non-superluminal OPERA neutrinos
My philosophy-of-science data reporting on OPERA would
be seriously incomplete if I did not add some remarks on studies
which considered a third possibility: non-superluminal OPERA
neutrinos. The obviously most-likely possibility was that the re-
sult by OPERA would not be confirmed (and indeed it turned
out to be right). The second road to the OPERA was the one de-
scribed in the previous subsection: taking OPERA at face value
and looking for ways to describe theoretically some superlu-
minal neutrinos of that sort. But it is indeed very interesting
from the viewpoint of philosophy of science that even taking
the OPERA result at face value we could not automatically con-
clude that superluminal neutrinos had been discovered, at least
not using exclusively the data reported by OPERA.
One of the main reasons for this resides in the nature of
the OPERA measurement: a very intense beam of neutrinos
was prepared at CERN and of the large number of neutrinos
crossing the OPERA detector at Gran Sasso only a very small
fraction could be observed (due to the weakness of the inter-
actions of ∼ GeV neutrinos). We know from other areas of
physics that in certain experimental setups of this sort, when a
small sample of the particles prepared is observed, nominally
(but not substantially, see later) superluminal speeds may be
measured. Arguments based on these points and/or some re-
lated points were discussed in a few OPERA papers (see, e.g.,
Refs. [50, 51, 52]). I am here going to focus on my personally
favorite variant of this class of possibilities, whose discussion
involves topics of interest for philosophy of science not only in
relation to the OPERA story but also beyond it.
I will mainly focus in this subsection on the fact that, even
assuming Einstein relativity to still hold, detecting some parti-
cles with a superluminal travel time from their point of emis-
sion is not automatically excluded. Indeed Einstein relativity
predicts that no “signal” (no information) can travel superlumi-
nally and this translates into a bound on travel times for single
particles only in the classical limit. Within quantum mechanics
the relationship between signal and particle is complicated by
wave-particle duality and in general the notion of travel time
becomes very subtle [53, 54].
I find that these subtleties are best explained by quickly
summarizing the issues, the experimental facts and the emerg-
ing theoretical understanding of the most famous “travel-time
issue”, the one concerning the tunneling time. In the classical
limit a particle encountering a potential barrier higher than its
kinetic energy simply cannot manage its way to the other side of
the barrier. Quantum-mechanical effects provide such a particle
with a non-zero (but small) probability of ending up on the other
side of the barrier. This is well known and well understood.
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But how much time does it take a particle to quantum-tunnel
through a barrier? This is a tough question, whose importance
has been clear since the early days of quantum mechanics [55,
56, 57], and remains the main focus of a very active area of both
theory and experimental research [53, 58, 59, 60, 61].
One can easily see that the answer is subtle. For example,
for speeds much smaller than the speed of light we express the
speed v of a particle in terms of its kinetic energy K and its
mass m, and the kinetic energy is in turn obtained subtracting










Since in quantum tunneling E −U < 0 this recipe for the speed
(and therefore the corresponding derivation of the travel time)
becomes meaningless. This prepares us for surprises, but still
does not tell us how much time it takes a particle to quantum-
tunnel through a barrier.
And, as summarized in Fig.2, what we find experimentally
in trying to determine the travel time of particles through such
a quantum tunnel is rather subtle. We have robust experimental
evidence of the fact that, under appropriate conditions, a parti-
cle prepared at time ti in a quantum state centered at (with peak
of the probability distribution located at) a certain position to
one side of a barrier is then found [53, 58, 59, 60] on the other
side of the barrier at time tf with distribution peaked at a dis-
tance L from the initial position, with L bigger than c(tf − ti).
It is also by now well established that this apparently “super-
luminal” behavior which we find in experimental data is not
in conflict with Einstein’s relativity, and indeed it follows ex-
actly the predictions of theoretical models of quantum tunnel-
ing faithfully based on Einstein’s relativity [53, 58, 59, 60, 61].
Figure 2: A “cartoonist impression” of an aspect of the tunneling-time issue.
The figure shows a time sequence (greentime, bluetime, redtime) of descrip-
tions of a probability distribution for the position of a particle along a given
spatial direction (the horizontal direction). Two time sequences are shown:
the top panel is for propagation without a barrier while the bottom panel ac-
counts for a barrier located (but not shown in figure) where the horizontal line
is thicker. At redtime of the bottom panel I am only showing the small trans-
mitted peak, since showing the large reflected peak would affect the visibility.
An anomaly appears to be present if one focuses on the time interval found tim-
ing the peak (of the entire distribution) before reaching the barrier and timing
the peak (of the small transmitted distribution) after tunneling through the bar-
rier. Naively this would suggest that the particles that do tunnel through take a
time for traversing the tunnel which is shorter than the time needed by the same
particles to traverse a distance in vacuum equal to the length of the barrier.
The key point for this emerging understanding is that such
measurement setups, determining the most likely spacetime event
of production of a particle and the most likely spacetime event
of detection of a particle, establish a time interval associated to
the peaks of two different distributions. The expression “travel
time of the peak” is only legitimate to the extent that at first
there is a large peaked distribution approaching the barrier from
one side, and then a much smaller (transmitted) peaked distribu-
tion is measured on the other side of the barrier. But, contrary
to our instinctive classical-limit-based intuition, as a result of
quantum-mechanical effects (such as interference) the peak ob-
served after the barrier is not some simple fraction of the peak
that was approaching the barrier. Travel times of distribution
peaks, are not travel times of any signal, and therefore “super-
luminal” experimental results for such travel times are not in
conflict with Einstein’s relativity. For smooth, frequency-band
limited, distributions the precursor tail of the distribution allows
to infer by analytic continuation [53, 60, 61] the structure of the
peak. Under such conditions, even for free propagation, by the
time the peak reaches a detector it carries no “new informa-
tion” [53] with respect to the information already contained in
the precursor tail. An example of “new information” is present
in modified distributions containing “abrupt” signals [53, 61],
and indeed it is found that when these new-information features
are sufficiently sharp they never propagate superluminally [61].
So, at least at the qualitative level, there is no such dra-
matic difference between the established experimental results
on tunneling times reported, e.g., in Ref. [60], and the travel-
time results that were being reported by OPERA. But comput-
ing the signal travel time properly for OPERA neutrinos, trav-
elling through rock and interacting with nucleons via weak in-
teractions, is much harder than for idealized quantum-tunneling
exercises. Moreover, from this information-theory perspective
OPERA’s claim appeared to be quantitatively unmanageable:
one can estimate [52] that the probability distribution of an
OPERA neutrino is spread out over roughly 10−3 nanoseconds,
so anomalies for travel times of distribution peaks of ∼ 60
nanoseconds (the “travel-time anomaly reported by OPERA)
would require an overall shift of the distribution peak by some
105 peak widths.
Of course, also from this travel-time perspective the emerg-
ing revision [26] of the OPERA claim puts matters to rest. But
the shared fascination for the OPERA anomaly had the posi-
tive effect of creating some shared knowledge among particle-
physics experts of neutrino phenomena and relativists interested
in travel time anomalies of the sort of the tunneling-time is-
sue. Moreover, pondering on the OPERA anomaly one stum-
bles upon a quantitative argument suggesting that perhaps we
are not far from the point where in neutrino studies of this sort,
quite independently of the OPERA story, we might encounter
some manifestation of the peculiarities of the travel-time con-
cept in quantum mechanics. This estimate I can offer is based
on the well-established understanding [53, 58, 59] that the pe-
culiarities of the tunneling-time problem are directly linked to
the “evanescence” produced by the barrier: inside the barrier,
in the classically forbidden region, the probability of finding a
particle decreases exponentially with the depth of the barrier.
There is some evanescence also in the description of the propa-
gation of neutrinos in rock: the probability of finding a neutrino
after a certain distance travelled in rock decrease slowly but
with an exponential law, because of the small probability of a
weak-interaction process between the neutrino and the nucleons
composing the rock. For previous neutrino travel-time experi-
ments [21] the evanescence of neutrinos in rock was neglected,
and it proved to be a robust choice. And evidently, on the basis
of Refs. [26, 27] also for OPERA neutrinos this evanescence is
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negligible. To see that however we might not be far from the
point where evanescence should be taken into account let me
actually compute the fraction of a pulse of ∼ 20GeV neutri-
nos that when sent from CERN to LNGS would be absorbed in
rock. This is obtained [62, 63] multiplying the neutrino-nucleon
cross section σ(20GeV ) ' 1.4 · 10−37cm2, for the the density
ρNA of nucleons in rock, and the distance L between CERN
and LNGS:
L (ρNA) σ(20GeV ) ' (7·107cm)2·10
24
cm3
(1.4·10−37cm2) ' 2 · 10−5
So it happens to be the case that the OPERA setup is just bring-
ing us to the level of accuracy of travel-time determinations
where absorption-induced evanescence could be significant:
OPERA measures the CERN-LNGS travel time with accuracy
of a few parts in 105 and for OPERA neutrinos evanescence is
an effect worth ∼ 2 · 10−5.
If not for the cost of such experiments it would certainly
be interesting from this perspective to have some sort of up-
graded OPERA capable of achieving an even better ratio be-
tween neutrino evanescence and travel-time accuracy. If any-
thing of any interest came out in this direction there I would
have my centauro-event like OPERA story (see the opening re-
marks of this section).
2. Very preliminary data analysis
I deliberately do not attempt a detailed analysis of the philosophy-
of-science data I have here reported. This choice not only re-
flects the fact that, as an amateur philosopher, this would be be-
yond my strengths, but also reflects my general views on data
reporting (even for the very different context of physics data): I
feel experimentalists give their maximal contribution when they
report bare data, without contamination of theory speculations
(and I am here acting as an experimentalist for the phenomenol-
ogy of philosophy of science).
Still in this section I do offer some comments on the data I
reported, but my readers should notice that here the real objec-
tive is not developing theory but rather to use my OPERA data
as basis for giving a less vague idea of what could constitute the
objectives of phenomenology of philosophy of science.
2.1. Falsifying theories?
It seems among modern philosophers the idea that theo-
ries can be falsified is out of fashion, but remains a key ref-
erence point in the background of the philosophy-of-science
debate. The OPERA story provides a perfectly suitable con-
text for articulating viewpoints related to this issue on the basis
of contemporary developments rather than digging (with all the
“fuzziness” that implies) in the history of physics6.
6Moreover, for some issues of interest for philosophy of science, such as
understanding the ingredients of a “scientific revolution”, I feel that focusing
exclusively on paradigm shifts that did occur is limiting. There is as much
to be learned on these issues from cases where a “scientific revolution” was
tried but failed (as in this OPERA story) as in cases where actually the pro-
posed paradigm shift was ultimately adopted. I find that historians of physics
introduce a bias in this respect by giving much more accurate accounts of the
paradigm shifts that did prevail with respect to the cases of failed attempts of
paradigm shift.
Actually I feel that the most interesting aspects of the OPERA
story for what concerns the falsification issue reside in the fact
that the OPERA experiment was testing a simple “law”, the rel-
ativistic bound v ≤ c describing the speed of light as the max-
imum achievable speed. This affords us some freedom from
the cumbersome aspects of “falsifying a theory” or “replacing a
theory paradigm”. And in turn this is comforting to me: I surely
do not read enough philosophy (and I might have been reading
the wrong sources), but it happens to be the case that most of
the philosophers I did read use a very naive notion of “falsify-
ing a theory” for which I find no place in science. Evidently
the core activity of science is to summarize large collections of
measurement results into some useful/predictive simple “laws”
and some useful/predictive manageable algorithms7. The sim-
ple law v ≤ c is a prototypical example of what a very powerful
law can do for us. There is no higher achievement in science
than establishing for such a powerful law the limitations to its
applicability (which is the situation usually described, with hor-
rible choice of terminology, as “falsifying” the law).
But even shifting our focus from the overwhelming goals of
“falsifying theories” and/or “replacing paradigms” to the more
limited arena of “falsifying laws” of the type v ≤ c the chal-
lenges for philosophy of science (and, in my view, for the phe-
nomenology of philosophy of science) are not completely triv-
ial.
Can we really falsify v ≤ c? in which sense? on the back-
ground of some reigning theory and/or reigning paradigm? or
in some more theory-independent sense?
Relevant for exploring conceptually these issues is the exercise
of imagining the hypothetical situation in which the OPERA
result actually stood up, and repetitions of the OPERA mea-
surement confirmed it. Also relevant is the fact that we do have
the technological ability for performing an OPERA-type mea-
surement in (good) vacuum rather than for neutrinos traveling
through rock (it would require a huge money investment but the
technology is there for doing it). What if the OPERA result was
confirmed also in vacuum? And testing it over a broad range of
distances we kept finding speeds of ∼ 20GeV neutrino that
were superluminal by ∼ 2 · 10−5?
What would it take for us to falsify the claim that there are
no superluminal speeds?
There are many (far too many) pages of philosophy of sci-
ence devoted to whether Newtonian gravity had been falsified
7While, as emphasized above, with these notes I am not intending to do any
“theory of knowledge” or “theory of science”, let me take the brief liberty to
stress that what I gave as description of the core activity of science does not
amount to ascribing to the philosophy of instrumentalism. As a humble the-
oretical physicist (and a humble experimentalist of philosophy of science) the
concept of “true picture of the world” is unintelligible to me, but I am well
prepared to acknowledge that others may be capable of appreciating this con-
cept and dwell about it. Still my description of the core activity of science as
the one of summarizing large collections of measurement results into some use-
ful/predictive simple “laws” and some useful/predictive manageable algorithms
is evidently correct, factually correct. Dwelling on whether those typical prod-
ucts of science contain (or bring us any closer to) the “true picture of the world”
is a task better reserved to philosophers (theorists of knowledge). So evidently
I am not advocating the philosophy of instrumentalism, but I am advocating a
probably novel approach in which the answers to questions such as “how and
why science works?” are sought in two stages: a first stage where concerns for
the ”true picture of the world” are postponed and one adopts an instrumental-
ist perspective (not a full philosophy, but just a perspective for the first level of
analysis), and a second stage where issues pertaining to what is the ”true picture
of the world” come into discussion.
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at the time when Einstein gravity was adopted. Embracing
phenomenology of philosophy of science also means replacing
some of those pages with pages devoted, for example, to the
OPERA anomaly attempting to establish what it would take for
OPERA-type measurements to falsify the speed-of-light limit.
2.2. Refuting experimental results?
As I stressed repeatedly, the OPERA story is an example of
attempt by theorists to refute an experimental result.
Can that be done?
The philosophy-of-science data I have reported suggest that it
can, but I believe they are inconclusive.
Actually, as an old-fashioned physicist I stick to the idea that
theorists can never refute experiments. An experimental result
can only be refuted by other experimental results (and only to
a certain extent). An example of what I mean by other ex-
periments refuting a certain given experimental result is pro-
vided by the relatively recent story concerning cold fusion: a
huge effort was directed toward reproducing the initial claim
by Fleischmann and Pons in other experiments, and the evi-
dence gathered by those studies allowed to establish that some
source of systematic error had to have been overlooked in the
Fleischmann-Pons study. In such cases we might even never
know which specific systematic error had been overlooked and
yet establish, on the basis of the consistent results of other iden-
tical (or nearly identical) experiments, that there had to have
been some overlooked systematic error in the original Fleischmann-
Pons study. Fact is the Fleischmann-Pons study did not lead
to the introduction of some useful/predictive simple “law” or
some useful/predictive manageable algorithms. Humanity has
no cold fusion (as of 2012).
So experimental results can be refuted8 by other experimen-
tal results. The view that this is the only way we can refute an
8Let me be perhaps overzealous and stress the difference between the no-
tion of “refuting an experimental result” and the notion of “reinterpreting an
experiment”. I appear to find that in philosophy publications the notion of rein-
terpreting an experiment is of very strong interest, often even more than the
notion of refuting an experimental result. This will always be the case when
philosophy dwells about the the “true picture of the world”, since reinterpre-
tation is a crucial issue for such debates. An example of reinterpretation is
provided by comparing the description of experimental results on the gain or
loss of weight by materials being burned that was fashionable at the time of the
Phlogiston Theory and the description of those same experimental results that
became fashionable after the discovery of oxygen. The discovery of oxygen
in no way affects the robustness of previous experimental results on the gain
or loss of weight by materials being burned, and in particular the discovery of
oxygen in no way led to the discovery of unnoticed sources of systematic error
in those experimental results. The same experimental results apply equally well
to the theories informed by the discovery of oxygen but the language used in
describing those results has changed. Experiments done nowdays on the gain or
loss of weight by materials being burned still find results for those changes of
weight that are fully consistent with the ones from 3 centuries ago. In contrast
no issue of reinterpretation is involved in the Fleischmann-Pons cold-fusion
story. The experimental result announced by Fleischmann and Pons was re-
futed by performing other experiments identical to (or nearly identical to) the
Fleischmann-Pons type. If nowadays we follow the procedures described 3
centuries ago for inducing changes of weight of materials by burning we in-
deed obtain changes of weight of materials by burning. If nowadays we follow
the procedures described some 20 years ago by Fleischmann and Pons for ob-
taining excess heat we do not obtain excess heat. Next century probably what
Fleischmann and Pons were trying to produce will not be interpreted as excess
heat but as something else, and yet if at some point in the next century someone
follows the Fleischmann-Pons procedure for producing excess heat (then rein-
terpreted as something else) that someone will still not obtain any excess heat
(unless the relevant laws change wildly over time...).
experimental result is not a consensus view among physicists,
as shown by aspects of the OPERA story which I summarized
above.
Can philosophy of science help? Can theorists, at least in some
very special situations, refute an experimental result, even be-
fore any information is available from experiments attempting
to reproduce that experimental result?
2.3. Blinding and the theory of knowledge
One point that should not be missed in the phenomenology-
of-science data I reported is that the efforts motivated by the
(apparent) OPERA anomaly produced ideas worth exploring
and made us learn facts worth knowing. Some of the tech-
niques of data analysis invented by the OPERA collaboration
were subjected to very carefully scrutiny and they proved re-
liable. These techniques are now a valuable resource for the
future. This in particular applies to the case of the techniques
used by the OPERA collaboration for extracting an estimate of
single-particle travel times from a setup which required a very
subtle statistical analysis.
And also some of the theory results obtained studying the
OPERA anomaly have significance that extends well beyond
the short season of the OPERA story. For example, some of
the results obtained for violations of special relativity in the
OPERA regime also apply to studies of the fate of relativity
at the Planck scale, where we expect a rather virulent inter-
play between quantum mechanics and general relativity with
potentially significant implications for tests of special relativ-
ity [39, 40, 41, 42].
I find that the overall balance of the OPERA story is pos-
itive. But some other physicists argue that the OPERA story
should teach us to better guard against the wastefulness of (the
wastefulness they perceive in) questioning a sound law. I fear
that what might ultimately be at stake here in this useful/wasteful
difference of assessments is the fate of the blind-analysis stan-
dards in fundamental physics. As in most modern particle-
physics experiments, OPERA’s analyses were “blinded”: the
criteria used, including the estimates of systematic errors, were
fine-tuned before the data were looked at. Once the data were
analysed, the results were announced without much delay and
with no further tweaks. Experience tells us that strict adop-
tion of this blind-analysis procedure maximizes our chances for
new discoveries and for sound reporting of experimental results.
And an analysis of such concerns must be relevant for any “the-
ory of knowledge”.
However, if indeed the preliminary OPERA result is not
confirmed, some are bound to propose that we soften the blind-
analysis standards. Experimentalists who find that their results
contrast with “known” physics might be encouraged to post-
pone announcement of the results, and first look determinedly,
in a non-blinded way, for systematic errors that might make
the contrast go away. This is horrifying to me, since I fear it
would introduce a potentially disastrous bias against important
discoveries. Questioning our laws, even on the basis of prelimi-
nary experiments, is a healthy exercise. And we should have as
our top priority the one of not introducing any risk of missing a
potentially important discovery.
On the contrary the OPERA story might leave in fundamen-
tal physics not only effectively lowered standards of blind anal-
ysis, but also an atmosphere hostile to new discoveries. It must
be already difficult for a young experimentalist to report results
that appear to contradict “known” facts. And it will be now
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perhaps even more difficult. For example, the PI of the OPERA
experiment was led to resign its role. What sort of message
does that convey?
I hope the sort of message I imagine will not reach young
experimentalists with good innovative experimental ideas. But
surely an opportunity was missed with the general public: the
OPERA story attracted huge attention in the general public and
as it unfolded (particularly with the news of the resignation of
OPERA’s PI) the general public got the idea that this was sci-
ence done wrongly, whereas it was just a prototypical example
of science at its best (though not its luckiest).
2.4. On-time progressiveness/degenerativeness analysis
I am arguing that some aspects of philosophy of science are
part of science, they are useful to mankind and the relevant the-
ories can be tested. For example the best theories of knowledge
will survive confrontation with the type of data I have reported,
and weaker alternatives will be “effectively falsified”.
Theories of knowledge that are useful to mankind should for
example guide our choices about which research programmes
should be funded by citizens who have chosen a certain set of
objectives for their society. An example of philosophical debate
that is relevant from this perspective is the one mainly centered
around Lakatos notion of progressive and degenerative research
programmes. No trace of this is found in the way funding agen-
cies evaluate research programmes in fundamental physics, and
probably this is causing a tangible waste of resources.
The analysis of these aspects of the theory of knowledge
cannot be confined to endless highly-educated debates. We
must test them. And clearly we can, at least to some extent
we can test them: if these (aspects of) theories of knowledge
are supposed to be useful there must be a way for us to verify
whether or not a given proposal for such a theory is indeed use-
ful. [Here the word “useful” is evidently not free from chal-
lenges of objectification and quantification, but shying away
from those challenges, perhaps only because of discomfort to-
ward seeking partial/improvable answers, is an option we can-
not afford, considering the limitations of our resources.]
I notice that to some extent this is done, but only in the awk-
ward sense of postdictions: alternative theories of knowledge
compete on the basis of how well they describe what happened
in the past. But if they are to be useful they better be good
at describing the future, making predictions, as normal for any
science. And this is where “experimental tests” would be rele-
vant within phenomenology of philosophy of science. Let me
take the OPERA story and the notions of progressive and de-
generative research programmes as an example. The OPERA
literature was composed of more than 200 papers in 6 months,
with theoretical-physics theories born and dead in a matter of
weeks. In order for phenomenology of philosophy of science
to work one would need a comparably sizable and compara-
bly timely9 effort on the philosophy-of-science side, over those
six months, providing for example analyses of which OPERA-
anomaly theories were, at a given time, in a degenerative or pro-
gressive phase. Another example would be the analysis of stud-
ies claiming that the OPERA result could be refuted and/or that
certain theoretical descriptions of the OPERA anomaly could
be ruled out.
9A related perspective can be found in Ref. [64], where it is observed that
the ongoing development of research on the quantum-gravity problem deserves
being of interest for philosophy of science right now, as the process unfolds
(rather than being postponed until “quantum gravity is found” and some sort of
consensus on quantum gravity is reached).
2.5. “Normal science” and the weakness of indirect bounds in
fundamental physics
“Normal science” is a notion from philosophy of science
which is totally foreign to this author. I know only good and
bad science. At least in fundamental physics one can however
find applicability for a notion of “normal-science season” which
could be used to identify a period in which no experimental re-
sult is striking enough to force a change of “theory paradigm”.
It is true that the history of fundamental physics could be di-
vided accordingly into a sequence of normal-science seasons
interrupted by periods where a new theory paradigm is estab-
lished.
The OPERA phenomenology-of-philosophy-of-science data
I here reported clearly testify that in the present (depressingly
long) normal-science season many physicists maintain full readi-
ness toward possibly adopting a new paradigm, as soon as ex-
perimental results suggest10 this might be appropriate. Several
physicists working at the present time are actually mainly fo-
cusing their work on figuring out what are the best chances
for experimental studies to finally provide a hint toward a new
paradigm, and research on OPERA was just a tiny snapshot of
what for example is a characteristic feature from this perspec-
tive of most of research on the quantum-gravity problem.
With all the pages devoted to creative reconstructions of
facts occurring in some distant past of science, history and phi-
losophy of science would be clearly better served diverting a
good portion of that attention to properly accounting for what is
going on now. One could easily see that the present fundamental-
physics community is driven by a sort of equilibrium between
those who take responsibility for seeking the advent of a new
paradigm and those who take responsibility for preserving the
status quo. Since the idea of balance in a single human sci-
entist remains a wild abstraction, we have this mechanism for
balance (for keeping science on the right track) composed of
two extremes: fools ready to swear we have understood every-
thing and wackos11 ready to swear we only got to know a tiny
10Of course, it is as usual difficult to look for a new paradigm only equipped
with the presently-adopted paradigms. At any given time there are plenty of
experimental results that do not fit in the present paradigm, and also for this the
OPERA anomaly is a good example. But it takes time for us to be confident that
one of these experimental results must be taken seriously. Most such anomalies
follow a path very similar to the one of the OPERA anomaly, a path taking us to
establish a pretty clear underestimation of systematic errors. And yet we must
(and we do) keep questioning them all, with OPERA-anomaly style. It seems
we cannot do better than questioning them from within the known paradigms
and the perhaps too cautious modifications of such paradigms which we are able
to conceive. With supernatural powers one could analyze all emerging (and
usually illusory, but occasionally magnificent) experimental puzzles in some
sort of comprehensive “space of paradigms”, with better chances of noticing
quickly that a new paradigm starts to be needed. The slower process available
to us is evidently good enough.
11Bias disclosure: I impose upon myself as work attitude an extreme wacko
mode. And on the rare occasions when I make time to read Newton and Galileo
I have a pretty weird perspective. On the one hand, when I make myself aware
of the historical context where those theories were formulated, and I remind
myself of how often, even in this 21st century, we still use those theories (for
tasks not extending beyond their regimes of applicability) I am overwhelmed
with admiration for Newton and Galileo. But on the other hand, if I allow
myself to step away from awareness of the relevant historical context, and read
Newton and Galileo as if they were writing now, I am overwhelmed with “poor-
thing sympathy” because of their amusingly clumsy way to describe Nature.
Advocates of the notion of “theory of everything” implicitly assume that we
are producing in this season of fundamental physics the ultimate descriptions of
Nature. I am absolutely sure that a scientist of the 25th century when looking (if
ever) upon the studies we produce in the present season of fundamental physics
will at best be overwhelmed with “poor-thing sympathy”.
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fraction of what is out there to be known.
I would argue that some interest from history and philos-
ophy of science is also deserved by the missing signatures on
the OPERA papers [14, 15]: a significant fraction (though a mi-
nority) of the OPERA collaboration did not sign these papers.
This may be worth investing some sizable investigatory work.
Uncontrolled rumors easily trackable on blogs and other inter-
net sources suggest that some of these missing signatures are
from experimentalists that, fully consistently with the scientific
method, were (instinctively or even on the basis of direct ex-
pertise with aspects of the apparatus) feeling the announcement
would be premature. These colleagues do not share my con-
cerns for strict adherence to the blind-analysis standards, but
this is a legitimate (though wrong) scientific position. It appears
likely however that some of those who did not sign the papers
simply did not sign them because they felt it would be foolish
to “challenge Einstein relativity”. Some philosophers may label
this second mechanism for not signing the papers as an aspect of
“normal science”, in my opinion granting too much complexity
to a simple manifestation of bad science (non-science).
And I would argue that of even greater interest for philos-
ophy of science is the role played by “indirect bounds” in the
analyses of the OPERA anomaly. My intuition is that a cer-
tain way to use indirect bounds is characteristic of a “normal-
science season”. A standard example of use of indirect bounds
is the hypothesis of adding sterile neutrinos to the Standard
Model of particle physics. This is a fully specified hypoth-
esis: it amounts to a specific change to the Standard Model,
adding a particle we have no direct evidence for to the particles
that are already in the Standard Model. Such a fully specified
hypothesis can be tested not only directly, by looking for the
sterile neutrinos themselves, but also indirectly, by looking for
the differences for other particles that arise if one adds to the
Standard Model the sterile neutrinos (with respect to the case
without sterile neutrinos). Bounds on some qualities of such
sterile neutrinos (such as their masses) can then obviously be
obtained without observing them directly, but rather studying
more accurately properties of the Standard-Model particles we
already know.
This method of indirect bounds has a long and very rep-
utable tradition in fundamental physics, and to some extent in
the whole of science. But it should be noticed that the proposal
of sterile neutrinos that I just described involves no paradigm
change: one adds sterile neutrinos to the existing paradigm and
more precisely in a very specific manner within a known the-
ory (a theory fully fitting with the presently adopted paradigm).
The OPERA anomaly however had the potentialities of being a
paradigm shifter: if for example it had led to abandoning spe-
cial relativity it would have taken us to some place we cannot be
sure of being able to imagine right now. A crucial question for
fundamental physics is “to what extent we can rely on indirect
bounds when we analyze an hypothesis of paradigm shift?”. I
leave to trained philosophers of science to ponder this question.
My uneducated position is that in such cases indirect bounds
carry little or no relevance. But, as shown by the philosophy-
of-science data I reported above, it is rather common for most
physicists of this normal-science season to think that indirect
bounds also apply to cases of investigation of paradigm shift.
This is particularly clear in Subsec. 1.3: the OPERA tentative
announcement of superluminal ∼ 20GeV neutrinos was be-
ing “refuted” on the basis of the fact that the simplest mod-
els incorporating superluminality of such neutrinos would have
affected some particle-physics processes in ways incompatible
with established experimental bounds on those particle-physics
processes.
2.6. Regimes of physics: what did we learn from OPERA?
I already stressed above that (at least from the “centauro-
events perspective” discussed in the opening remarks of the
previous section) we did learn a lot from studying the appar-
ent OPERA anomaly.
There is however an aspect of “what is knowledge”, rele-
vant for studies of the OPERA neutrino-velocity measurement,
that feels more real, at least to my uneducated philosophical
eyes. This has to do with the notion of “regimes of physics”.
More precisely the notion of “new regime of physics”, which
I shall only be able to describe here very preliminarily. And
in spite of the preliminary nature of my characterization read-
ers will notice that my objective is to argue that our knowledge
always grows very significantly, independently of the outcome
of the experiment, whenever we manage to perform a new ex-
periment that gives us access to a “genuinely new regime of
physics”. I expect that the philosophy debate on this notion
might end up teaching us that each measurement gives us ac-
cess to a new regime of physics, but what is desirable for the
progress of science is to somehow quantify the amount of nov-
elty of the regime studied by an experiment, so that we can
assign priority (also for what concerns funding) to experiments
probing more novel regimes of physics.
I will illustrate part of these notions by stressing that the
OPERA neutrino-velocity measurement did gain us access to a
genuinely new regime of physics. Most researchers working on
the OPERA anomaly were particularly puzzled by it because
this was for particles with energies of a few tens of GeV, i.e.
energies which we have produced with ease at particle acceler-
ators for the last few decades: there appeared to be a mismatch
between the amount of surprise the (preliminary) measurement
result contained and the rather ordinary regime of physics that
was being probed. This way of reasoning reflects the struc-
ture of the extraordinarily successful “discovery paradigm”12
for fundamental physics in the 20th century: we kept making
important new discoveries by gradually gaining access to ex-
periments producing particles of higher and higher energy.
This paradigm was so successful that at this point some
physicists cannot see any other paradigm. But I expect that ev-
ery discovery paradigm eventually runs out of steam. And sev-
eral hints suggest that the 20th century discovery paradigm is
at the point of needing to be replaced. Also from this perspec-
tive it is important to appreciate that actually one can make a
meaningful case that OPERA neutrino-velocity measurements
did gain us access to an interestingly new regime of physics.
12I am aware of the usefulness of the notion of “theory paradigm” within phi-
losophy of science. With “discovery paradigm” I am clearly labeling a rather
different, actually complementary notion. The complementarity resides in the
fact that a theory paradigm is used for interpreting/describing experimental re-
sults, whereas a “discovery paradigm” is used as guidance for devising new
experiments perceived as providing good chances of significant new discover-
ies. The most prototypical and successful discovery paradigm of 20th-century
fundamental physics was centered on particle accelerators: we kept seeking
ways to produce (and collide) particles of higher and higher energy, and at each
new energy level reached we made experimental discoveries which helped us
shape the Standard Model. Incidentally, it appears that this discovery paradigm
is running out of steam: achieving greater particle energies used to be easier
and used to produce more significant discoveries in earlier applications of this
discovery paradigm, whereas for the most recent applications of this discovery
paradigm gaining even just an order of magnitude in particle energy took a huge
effort and produced relatively insignificant discoveries.
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The main point for appreciating this is to notice that, al-
though their energies have values in no way exceptional, the
speeds of OPERA’s neutrinos are truly exceptional. Among
previous accurate measurements of velocity for massive par-
ticles we have the ones in Ref. [65] for electrons with energy
of about 15GeV . Therefore energies comparable to the ones
of OPERA neutrinos, but speeds significantly smaller than for






so for particles of the same energy E the speed is much closer
to the limiting speed of light if the mass is smaller. And for
electrons we know that the mass is ∼ 0.5 · 106eV while for
neutrinos we have so far established that the mass is . 10eV .
As mentioned above, the neutrino speed measurement that
had been previously reported in Ref. [21] was for neutrinos of
higher energy, and therefore speed even closer to the speed
of light, but had lower accuracy. So, as far as concerns mea-
surements of speeds of massive particles (speeds therefore in-
evitably different from the speed of light) the OPERA measure-
ment was truly unique, record setting. It is in these cases that
my concerns for the use of indirect bounds apply most strongly:
how can we use indirect bounds on a regime never accessed
before and for testing the hypothesis that this regime requires
a new theory paradigm? I think one simply cannot apply in-
direct bounds to such hypotheses, and I am confident that the
phenomenology of philosophy of science will eventually find
results in agreement with this expectation.
And let me also stress that the regime probed by OPERA
is also a regime for which in some sense, at least adopting a
strict exploratory attitude, we are prepared for surprises. In or-
der to appreciate this one should be familiar with the “mys-
tery” surrounding the possible role of the “Planck scale” in
physics [28, 29]. We expect this scale to be characteristic of
the onset of some new theory paradigm. By combining known
values of the speed-of-light scale, Planck constant and Newton





' 1.2 · 1028eV
Assuming (rather legitimately) that the mass of OPERA neutri-








suggesting that the energy of OPERA neutrinos is closer to the
Planck scale than it is close to its minimum value, the rest
energy m. For an electron condition (2) requires energies of
∼ 1017eV , and we never saw an electron like that. For a proton
condition (2) requires energies of ∼ 1019eV , and we infer that
some of the ultra-high-energy cosmic rays we observe are pro-
tons with energies between 1019eV and 1021eV , but for those
ultra-high-energy cosmic rays we have absolutely no speed de-
termination in our data, so as far as we know their speeds could
have all sorts of weird properties.
I went through this exercise of attempting to characterize
the OPERA neutrino-speed measurement as one that gained us
access to a new regime also as a way to illustrate the type of rea-
soning a physicist can follow in trying to assess the proposal (or
the results of) an experiment. The line of reasoning I adopted
shows how these assessments can be very significant but also
suggests that they might lack objectivity: do the crude estimates
I showed above really provide an objective characterization of
the OPERA measurement as a new-regime measurement? Or
could I build a case of similar nature for any experiment if I al-
lowed myself to use logics so loosely? What constitutes then a
truly new regime of physics? Can we have model-independent
characterizations of what constitutes a new regime of physics?
Or is it the case that our arguments of what could be an inter-
esting new regime of physics are so dependent on our current
models/paradigms that they loose meaningfulness in the search
of new theory paradigms?
3. A little more on phenomenology of philosophy of science
In closing, let me look a bit beyond the OPERA anomaly.
After all, evidently, I used the OPERA anomaly as pretext for
trying to make a point of more general applicability.
Fundamental physics of the past, particularly from the be-
ginning of the 20th century, has played a significant role in
shaping parts of modern philosophy of science. Perhaps most
philosophers have not noticed how different fundamental physics
is now. It is not just that we of course study different ques-
tions, but rather we study them in a way that is different. The
OPERA-story pretext allowed me illustrate these changes more
simply than needed for other aspects of fundamental physics
that may require the urgent attention of philosophy, including
“quantum gravity”, “theories of everything”13, “anthropic prin-
ciple”, and the “multiverse”. My main point here was that phi-
losophy of science can be useful for all this. It can be tangibly
useful, at least in as much as it can inform our choices con-
cerning where to invest resources if we are chasing a given set
of objectives. But any human endeavor that wants to claim to
be useful is automatically subjectable to experimental test, and
therefore requires the development of a phenomenology. If a
theory of knowledge is tangibly useful, than alternative theories
of knowledge should be compared on the basis of their track
record14 of usefulness. And among the efforts needed of course
we should include theories (improvable/falsifiable theories) of
what is and how we should quantify this usefulness of theories
of knowledge. Moreover, just like with ordinary scientific pro-
grammes, we should acknowledge the need to keep a certain
balance in the distribution of resources: daring to assign more
resources to the theories of knowledge with a more established
track record of usefulness while not neglecting completely out-
of-mainstream theories of knowledge (at a later reassessment
13Bias disclosure: I am on the far extreme of “against everything”. Actually
a good part of my motivation for proposing a “phenomenology of philosophy
of science” is that I expect its development can contrast the advance of the idea
of “theory of everything” among physicists. I shall not dwell on this here, but I
find that faith in a theory of everything (or even just faith in the idea of a theory
of everything) is not only to be placed outside science, as all matters of faith,
but is actually armful to science. Faith in “theory of everything” reduces our
ability to be sufficiently inquisitive in our exploration of Nature.
14While working on this manuscript, still uncertain whether it would make
sense to announce such uneducated philosophy speculations, I took it as a good
sign when I stumbled on the internet (searching for something else of use for
these notes) on evidence of how Galileo’s first explorations of the scientific
method were looked down by contemporaries, as if his reasoning was so weak
it needed the vulgar help of experiments.
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of the situation we may find that some theory previously placed
out of the mainstream has in the meantime established a better
track record and should receive top-level funding and encour-
agement).
Something else which is changing, and is a point of doubly-
special relevance for this manuscript, is the “distance” between
theorists and experimentalists. Philosophy must have some-
thing to say about this. Right now in fundamental physics most
theorists understand nothing about experiments and most exper-
imentalists understand nothing about theory. Those who really
try very hard only manage very little: some theorists manage
to get vague understanding of the workings of fundamental-
physics experiments and some experimentalists have a partial
understanding of the formalisms used in fundamental-physics
theories. This situation is in part due to the nature of the task
involved, but it is also encouraged by practices in the commu-
nity (again a typical example being criteria for funding) that do
not sufficiently support the efforts that some of us direct toward
an interdisciplinary theory-experiment expertise.
For the phenomenology of philosophy of science which I
here ventured to imagine there would be from the onset such
a huge separation between experimentalists and theorists. The
typical experimentalist of philosophy of science would be some-
one like myself, a fundamental-physics theorist with little or no
understanding of the philosophy involved, and already now it
would be very hard for a philosopher to gain a better than su-
perficial knowledge of the theories and experiments at the fron-
tier of fundamental physics. Perhaps it cannot be done. But I
feel we must at least try. Perhaps we need the guidance of some
philosophy of the phenomenology of philosophy of science.
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